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Abstract: 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the debate about defining a small firm, or a small and medium-
sized enterprise (SME), and examining the relevance of this concern to the creative industries and 
creative businesses. The first part of this paper navigates this formation, and the positioning of the 
idea of small business within economic and political thought. The second part explores how the 
concept of small business is operationalized as SMEs, and the challenges of classification and 
empirical definition. The final part reflects on the implications for the understanding and usage of 
the term ‘creative SME’.  
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Foreword: 
 
This paper is a work in progress. It is not the final version. It represents a particular articulation of 
the problematic being engaged with. This means that other articulations are possible and that this 
should not be viewed as rigid or non-negotiable. It is also Europe, and in particular United Kingdom, 
centric and must be understood as such.  
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1.0 Introduction: 
 
The importance of small businesses or firms1, or small and medium sized enterprises (SME), is often 
asserted as a universal truth. On one hand is the idea that all things start small and grow; therefore 
‘small’ must be the origin of growth. On the other hand is the romantic notion of the creator, the 
entrepreneur, which has its popular figure as the small business; and therefore promoting small 
firms encourages enterprise and innovation. The figure of the creative business overlaps with such 
views, and is catapulted to even greater significance when it is positioned as the leading edge of the 
knowledge economy (Caves, 2000). In light of this, a large part of this paper is devoted to definitions 
in order to examine what entails small business in the creative and cultural industries (CCI). It should 
be noted that the common concept of an SME includes close to 99% of all firms and about 60% of 
employment (HM Treasury, 2008). There are 4.8 million businesses in the UK where over 99% of 
these businesses are small or medium sized businesses, employing less than 250 people. 4.6 million, 
or 96%, of all businesses are micro-businesses thereby employing 0-9 people (Rhodes 2012); 
moreover, small and medium-sized enterprises are responsible for 65% of employment and 57% of 
Gross Domestic Product within the UK (Madsing 1997). Data from other countries are similar. So, 
there is no question of their import. However, the mirror image shows the strategic efficiency 
debate is apparent: 1% of firms create 40% of employment. To this can be added the ‘survival rate’ 
of new firm formation in the UK, currently running at 17%; in other words, a 73% failure rate (HM 
Treasury, 2008). 
 
There is some value in both claims to relevance; however, there is also much confusion, 
misunderstanding, poor conceptualization, and ideology mixed in. The notion of the small firm is 
politically loaded. Little if any debate mentioned small firms before the 1970s2, by the mid- 1980s 
they were center stage as is illustrated by this quotation:  
 
Small businesses are the very embodiment of a free society - the mechanism by which the 
individual can turn his leadership and talents to the benefit of both himself and the nation. 
The freer the society, the more small businesses there will be. And the more small 
businesses there are the freer and more enterprising that society is bound to be 
(Conservative Political Centre, 1984, 11).  
 
In keeping with the then nascent neo-liberal ideals, small firm foundation was being held back by the 
state, and the shackles of red tape simply needed casting off to free the small firm wealth, and job 
creation programme. Of course, this version of causality overlooks the role of de-industrialisation 
and globalization in the creation of the unemployment problem and recession. In recent years, the 
rise of the creative economy has been coupled with enterprise, and the small firm form of many 
                                                 
1
 From this point onward the terms ‘business’ and ‘firm’ will be used interchangeably. 
2
 Beesley and Wilson (1981, 255) note from a review of Hansard that there was negligible mention of small firms in 
parliamentary debates prior to the mid-1970s. Likewise, the numbers of measures introduced shows a similar bias. In the 
whole post-war period up to 1970 there were just 15 measures, between 1971 and 1979, 30 measures (Beesley and Wilson 
1981, 305). In the 1983 election manifesto the Conservatives claimed some 108 measures implemented in favour of small 
firms. 
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creative businesses (see: Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999). This creates a potent mixture, and hence 
calls forth the need for careful analysis. 
 
The first part of this paper navigates this formation, and the positioning of the idea of small business 
within economic and political thought. The second part explores how the concept of small business 
is operationalised as SMEs, and the challenges of classification and empirical definition. The final 
part reflects on the implications for the understanding and usage of the term ‘creative SME’. 
 
2.0 The ‘small firm’: 
 
2.1 Conceptual overview 
 
The notion of the firm is axiomatic to neo-classical economic analysis, and all normative economic 
thought. The firm is the fundamental unit of analysis of the economy; but it is viewed externally, and 
as a universal concept. Critically, there is no interest in firm size, or indeed firm organisation or social 
context beyond the market. The firm is a nexus of rational economic action to maximise utility. 
Accordingly, orthodox approaches have not concerned themselves with small firms. Economic 
theory only concerns itself with large firms, or more precisely any firm that exerts market distortion 
usually through the exercise of monopoly. Thus, the logic addresses monopoly, not firm size per se, 
although monopolists are usually very large firms. 
 
Economic history and political economy more generally has more to say about social and political 
contexts of economic action; and particularly about the changing historical shifts in economies: from 
agriculture to manufacture; or the division of labour that gave rise organisationally to the factory 
system, mass production and flexible specialisation. From this point of view firm size is an 
independent variable, and the division of labour dependent (giving rise of sector specialisation, trade 
and the division of labour). 
 
In the post-war period in developed economies of the world economic activity was dominated by 
larger firms, with a significant degree of state ownership, and corporatism. This is not to suggest that 
small firms did not exist, but that the ‘economic weather’ was made by large firms. This is the period 
of significant growth of the vertically integrated company; that is the organisational internalisation 
of functions (that may have previously been carried out by ‘independent’ firms). The major shift at 
this time (1960s) increasing establishment of branch plants allowing firms to employ cheap labour in 
the regions, and latterly internationally.  
 
The 1970s oil crisis gave rise to a rupture in state-economy relations, and in particular corporate 
organisation. International branch plants and relocation lead to developed economies experiencing 
‘de-industrialisation’ of their former manufacturing heartlands (it had moved to the Global East). 
 
A number of economic organisational changes followed for firms with production still located in the 
Global North. Foremost of these changes was what is generally known as post-Fordism, or flexible 
specialisation. The organisation change was to reduce stock holding (idle capital) and create a ‘just in 
time’ system of supply, based on zero stock holding. This was accompanied by having a range of 
suppliers to reduce risk and retain maximum flexibility. In order to reduce risk most functions were 
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outsourced to separate (but in effect dependent) companies. These companies, especially in fashion 
retail, had zero commitment contracts (the buyer was not compelled to buy, and the supplier had to 
take returns unsold); firms echoed such terms by creating zero-hour contracts for ‘employees’. For 
example Rainnie (1984, 150)  stresses in the example of restructuring of the retail giant Marks and 
Spencer's (M&S) that the apparent 'freedom' and 'enterprise' of small firms within such new 
organisational networks may not be all it seems. M&S remains formally independent, but in reality 
utterly dependent upon small suppliers. The individual small firm was not important, but the 
continued existence of a number of small firms is vital; both for competition between small firms to 
keep down prices to M&S and to provide M&S with a flexibility of supplies- both of which provide 
M&S with a potential competitive advantage. That de-industrialisation strategies could be 
legitimized by rhetorical support of small firms is clearly significant. 
 
The import of the changes sketched above was that these processes have generated more small 
firms. It was not simply corporate strategy nor small firms per se; it was also deregulation that 
generated more small firms. In the broadcast sector the regulatory changes introduced under the 
BBC producer choice system, and the creation of Channel 4 as a programme publisher, not maker, 
immediately created an independent TV production sector made of small firms, and concomitantly 
led to the shrinkage of the BBC and ITV. Organisational change in TV industry in the UK gave rise to 
the appearance and flourishing of a large number of small independent production companies; from 
a starting point of zero the main broadcasters work mainly with 30 companies out of the ‘market’ of 
300 (Pratt and Gornostaeva, 2009). 
 
Institutional economists have explored the consequences of flexible specialisation in not only 
valorising the small firm, but also causing the co-location of those firms. This debate has taken place 
under the rubric of transactions costs analysis. The notion is that the decision to have a separate 
(small) firm is an economic one where transactions costs are minimised (often a balance of internal 
and external transactions costs); one of those transaction costs is time and transportation. Beyond 
this, debates about industrial districts and clusters have pointed to a range of social factors ranging 
from trust, reputation and learning as un-traded dependencies (see: Pratt, 2011). Critically, these lay 
outwith the firm, in the interstices of networks. 
 
2.2. Political formations and Policy debates 
 
As has been implied, the 1970s is generally held to be a watershed period in recent economic 
organisation; in particular it marked a distinctive shift in state-economy relations. The economic 
changes of post-Fordism were echoed in a redefinition of the role of the state in many economies 
driven by a popular political adherence to the notion of a ‘small state’ and ‘deregulation’; this 
develops into a wider adoption of the norms of neo-liberalism. In effect these shifts are a re-
brokering of the relations of state, economy and society. Politically, the shift is such that the 
previous focus on control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy (either state or corporate) is 
downplayed in favour of promoting an enterprise culture and the promotion of small firms. The 
ideological response is that state controls are the reason for poor economic performance (not 
globalisation), and that with free enterprise growth will naturally occur. So, the policy is remove, not 
create, regulation.  
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A related concern has been with innovation, a term which in political usage overlaps with enterprise 
and entrepreneurial activity. Innovation, is usually taken to mean future orientation, and hence in 
popular terminology a focus on the knowledge or hi-tech economy. Here, regulation is interpreted 
as the state ‘crowding out’ the private sector, or small firm. Related to the concerns of knowledge 
transfer, there has been a renewed focus on universities as knowledge and innovation institutions. 
By implication, as state funded institutions, universities are suspect and hence the assumption and 
implication has been to remove the ‘barriers’ to knowledge transfer. This narrative has a long history 
beginning with the science park movement. Again, the aim of was to encourage spin out of 
businesses from universities (i.e. the implication being that they were anti-business and against 
knowledge transfer). The solution in the science park model was ‘co-location’ or what we would now 
call ‘clustering’ to minimise transfer and transactions costs (Massey, Quintas et al. 1992). The same 
logic underpins much of the promotion of creative clustering, and agencies that promote technology 
transfer. The new designated state/university function is thus migrated away from education into 
the handmaiden of business change, or as a business broker. In a more punitive mode University 
research budgets have increasingly been linked with the amount of ‘impact’ (or knowledge transfer) 
achieved. 
 
Policy making at the local level has taken a different turn. There is a tension within right wing 
political formations between central and local control; this corresponds to a similar tension in left 
wing politics about local economic development. So, there is a shared language, although different 
intentions on local economic development. As noted above, institutional economic theory has had 
much to contribute about local capacity building, local clusters and the social-economic connection. 
In fact much of this work addresses the failure of small firms. That is the fragmented and 
unsustainable nature of much small firm activity, the lack of investment capacity, long term 
planning, training and strategy; let along competencies in marketing, international trade and legal 
issues. Importantly this work gives an important insight into the false premises that much political 
small firm policies operate on. Not surprisingly institutional economists highlight various aspects of 
networks and institutions as critical issues. Policy makers thus, influenced by this, have focused on 
interventions here: whether the delivery agency is public, private or third sector (depending on 
political stripe). 
 
3.0 Definitions 
 
3.1 Resolving definition and concept 
 
The important point to take away from this contextual review of the notion of the small firm and its 
economic role is that there is considerable scope for confusion over ideological aims and practice; 
that wider economic change can influence process and the appropriate point of intervention or 
regulation. 
 
We can see clearly that broader economic change, and in particular state-economy-society 
formations, have ‘changed the game’. The simplistic assertion of ‘small firms good, big firms bad’ 
rhetoric is untenable as well as separate from context. What a small firm is, and why it might be 
favoured is also subject to change; the nature of ownership, or dependence on market access, or 
regulation are clearly equally relevant.  
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In this context we can look at definitions, in the light of their politically and economically charged 
relevance. We can note that size (numbers of employees, less often turn over) is unaccountably used 
as a definition, only latterly does sector come into consideration, and even later ownership and 
control. We can note that the core concern emerges as one based on organisation, a topic that 
economics or neo-liberalism has little to directly contribute. What is needed is a systematic 
economic, social and cultural analytic lens to develop a focus on this complex issue. 
 
3.2 Quantity matters: From small firms to SMEs 
 
It was the problems identifying small firms and businesses which led to the invention of the term 
‘SME’ by the European Commission (Valsamakis, 2001). In practice, various meanings can be found 
which apply in different contexts (Tonge, 2001). According to Curran et al (1986, pp.3) trying to 
decide on a definition of small businesses became very problematic in the 1970s and 80s. One 
important reason for this is with regards to size and sector-specific activity; using Tonge’s ( 2001, 7) 
example, a small business in the oil and gas industry will have much higher levels of employment, 
sales and finance than a small firm in the car repair trades. Therefore, the important conclusion 
being that sector-specific delineations of size do indeed matter (Storey, 1994; Tonge 2001); this has 
implications for the creative industries which will be explained later.  
 
One of the first, indeed probably one of the most important, attempts to examine how we define 
the small firm, was the Bolton Report in 1971. He suggested that small businesses have an 
‘economic’ definition (qualitative) and a ‘statistical’ definition (quantitative) (Tonge, 2001). The 
economic definition regarded firms as being small if they: had a relatively small share of their market 
place; were managed by owners or part-owners in a personalised way and not through the medium 
of a formalised management structure; and they were independent, in the sense of not forming part 
of a larger enterprise (Tonge, 2001). According to Storey (1994, pp. 9) Bolton’s statistical definition 
was designed to address three main issues: first, to quantify the current size for the small firm sector 
and its contribution to economic aggregates such as gross domestic product, employment, exports 
and innovation; second to compare the extent to which the small firm sector has changed its 
economic contribution over time; and third, the definition would enable a comparison to be made 
between the contribution of small firms in one country with that of other nations. Table 1 below -
taken from Storey (1994) - illustrates these definitions. Bolton’s work highlighted one important 
point; it allowed for an understanding of small firms based on its sector. Thus, in two groups of 
sectors – manufacturing and construction, and mining and quarrying – the criterion was 
employment. In the three service sectors, the criterion was sales turnover, and in one sector – 
catering – it was based upon ownership. Finally, in road transport, it was based upon the physical 
assets of the business, in terms of the number of vehicles (Storey, 1994). Of course, it is noteworthy 
that the creative industries are not referred to in this work; moreover, the huge growth in the 
broadcast sector from the 1990s onwards has not been registered in general work on the small firms 
sector. 
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Table 1. Bolton Committee (1971) Definitions of a Small Firm.  
Sector  
 
Definition 
Manufacturing  
 
200 employees or less 
Construction 25 employees or less 
 
Mining and quarrying 25 employees or less 
 
Retailing Turnover of £50,000 or less 
 
Miscellaneous Turnover of £50,000 or less 
 
Services Turnover of £50,000 or less 
 
Motor trades Turnover of £100,000 or less 
 
Wholesale trades Turnover of £200,000 or less 
 
Road transport Five vehicles or less 
 
Catering All excluding multiples and brewery-
managed houses 
Source: Bolton, 1971 in Storey, 1994. 
 
Storey (1994), notes that the report drew criticism of both its ‘economic’ and ‘statistical’ definitions 
(see Tonge 2001 for the specific elements of these critiques).  What is important to note about 
Bolton’s work is that he set an agenda for looking at the importance of small firms in a time when 
historical changes were afoot regarding the restructuring of the economy in the Global North.  
Loecher (2000) has carried out a series of comparator analyses of small firm typologies in Europe 
that broadly echo the Bolton report in substance. A taxonomy of ‘activity’ seems to be at the heart 
of Bolton’s work, what constituted ‘activity’ depended greatly on both his statistical and economic 
definitions.   
 
3.3 From SMEs to Micros 
 
As stated earlier, the European Commission coined the term SME in 1997, in so doing it clarified 
what to qualify what it was to be considered an enterprise. According to the EU definition an 
enterprise is ‘any entity engaged in any economic activity, irrespective of its legal form’. This 
automatically flags up the question of what constitutes economic activity, especially in relation to 
the CCI. It does however try to encompass all activity within its spectrum.  
 
For operationalization purposes in the UK an enterprise is defined as long as it is registered (in any 
form) for tax purposes through HMRC. However there is a problem with HMRC definitions of SMEs: 
they employ fewer than 250 people, (as we noted above, that means 99% of all firms). HMRC collect 
data (see Table 2), but do not use for policy the notion of small, medium and micro. The size of a 
firm has to be understood with respect to its specific sector. It would be inaccurate to call a 
company ‘large’ if it employs more than 250 people in the oil and gas industry. Most emerging 
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‘smaller’ companies (what would be viewed as small firms in this sector) have more than 250 people 
employed by them. This would mean that by EC classifications, these companies are large when in 
fact they are not when compared to their specific sector activity.  
The 2005 report from the European Commission offers size criteria for defining SMEs of below 250, 
but also includes a subdivision of ‘medium’ and ‘micro’ enterprise (see Table 5). The UK does not 
have an equivalent, official definition of an SME; there are contrasting positions according to 
different organisations (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: UK SME Definitions according to different government organisations: 
Organisation Category Headcount Turnover 
British Bankers Association Medium Not Defined Not Defined 
 Small Not Defined £1M 
 Micro Not Defined Not Defined 
Companies Act 2006 Medium <250 £25.9M 
 Small <50 £3.26M 
 Micro Not Defined Not Defined 
Financial Services Authority SME <250 £43M 
 Micro <10 £2M 
Federation of Small 
Businesses 
Medium <250 
>49 
Not Defined 
 Small <50 
>10 
Not Defined 
 Micro <10 Not Defined 
HMRC SME <500 (after 2008) 
<250 (prior to 2008) 
£86M 
£43M 
 Micro Not Defined Not Defined 
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills(BIS) 
(formerly the DTI) 
SME <250 Not Defined 
 Micro Not Defined Not Defined 
 
The European Commission introduced a finer typology for Small, Medium and Micro firms (the latter 
having fewer than 10 employees) (see Table 5). This new category is closer to what most people 
might consider a small firm. In fact the category has its foundation in research on developing 
countries; however, clearly such firms are far from uncommon in developed economies (Kingombe, 
et al 2010). Moreover, in EU nomenclature, this micro category includes not having any employees 
and therefore extends the field to include sole-traders, freelancers. However, different nation states 
have their own definitions, primarily based upon payment of tax, or registering for VAT. For example 
for UK tax purposes, an entity engaged in economic activity may have three legal forms: (i) sole 
proprietor (including the self-employed); (ii) partnership; (iii)company.  Each of these forms has to 
be registered as such with HMRC, and the latter (company) also has to be registered with Companies 
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House. Each of the three may be ‘for profit’ or ‘not-for-profit’.  A ‘not-for-profit’ enterprise may also 
be registered as a charity or social enterprise, but that will not change its status as an enterprise.  As 
data are available on taxation and VAT these definitions play a significant part in monitoring SMEs.  
In the UK VAT registration is a commonly reported measure related to new firm formation. This is 
often presented as an indicator of economic growth (especially those who want to point to the 
entrepreneurial nature of small firms); of course survival rate (the difference of birth and deaths) is a 
relevant measure, not births. Turnover of small firms is significant (and if often cited as a 
weakness/waste). Of course, an even more balanced picture would be to draw figures for the whole 
economy, and the proportion of all growth related to the small firm sector. This is seldom done. A 
significant point here is that on average only 1 in 10 new start-ups survives – this represents a very 
poor return on investment of human and economic capital, let alone the disruption caused by 
bankruptcy and non-payment of bills (which is one of the important factors in other SMEs going 
bankrupt. 
 
Table 3. Business birth, death and net rate, England 2004-11:  
 
      
       
Year 
Birth rate (rate per 100 active 
enterprises) 
Death rate (rate per 
100 active enterprises) Net rate 
2004 13.2 11.5 1.7 
2005 12.7 10.6 2.1 
2006 11.7 9.5 2.2 
2007 12.4 10.0 2.4 
2008 11.7 9.7 2.0 
2009 10.2 12.1 -1.9 
2010 10.1 10.7 -0.6 
2011 11.4 9.9 1.5 
 
      
       
Source: Office for National Statistics     
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Table 4. 2011 birth and death rates by broad industry group (as defined by the ONS) 
 
                  
Counts given to the nearest thousand   
  
Active (000s) 
  
Births (000s) 
  
Deaths (000s) 
  
        
  Count 
  
Count 
Rate (per 
cent) 
  
Count 
Rate (per 
cent) 
  
      
                  
Production 149   12 8.2   13 8.5   
Construction 315   30 9.5   35 11.1   
Motor trades 75   6 8.4   6 7.6   
Wholesale 117   10 8.7   11 9.0   
Retail 217   23 10.5   21 9.7   
Transport & storage (inc. postal) 78   8 10.4   8 10.6   
Accommodation & food services 160   19 12.1   18 11.3   
Information & communication 178   26 14.8   18 9.8   
Finance & insurance 34   4 10.2   4 11.5   
Property 88   8 9.1   8 9.6   
Professional; scientific & technical 409   59 14.3   39 9.6   
Business administration and support 
services 207   29 14.1   25 11.9   
Education 35   3 9.4   3 8.7   
Health 95   8 8.2   6 6.4   
Arts; entertainment; recreation and 
other services 185   16 8.5   16 8.6   
                  
Total 2,343   261 11.2   230 9.8   
                  
                  
Source: Office for National 
Statistics                 
                  
Even such measures are not absolute; often they can be artefacts of tax rules. For example in film 
making Special production vehicles (SPV) are firms set up from one project only to be ‘clean’ for tax 
purposes. Thus a successful film making activity would involve regular and high turn over of firms: 
precisely a measure that is generally seen as a ‘bad’ indicator. The existence of tax data is one of the 
ways in which analyses in the fields of culture and creativity and small business can be skewed by 
opportunistic availability of data, rather than its meaning or appropriateness. This is why a 
conceptual foundation is so important. The EU (2005) ‘new’ SME definition is informative in this 
sense. Table 5 shows the schema clearly. 
Table 5 .European Commission SME Definitions:  
Organisation  Category Headcount Turnover 
European Commission 
(2005) 
Medium <250 £41M 
 Small <50 £8.2M 
 Micro <10 £1.7M 
Source: European Commission, 2005. 
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As can be noted headcount is supplemented by indicators of turnover (using two alternate 
measures). Beyond this a very important innovation is the consideration of whether the 
enterprise is independent, linked or a partner; this also includes an important small firm 
category the franchise. The EU offers precise cut off points for such relationships. An 
illustration is provided of a partner enterprise:  
 
This type of relationship represents the situation of enterprises which establish 
major financial partnerships with other enterprises, without one exercising effective 
direct or indirect control over the other. Partners are enterprises which are neither 
autonomous nor linked to one another.  
 
The guidance suggests that:  
 
Thus, if you have a 30% stake in another enterprise, you add 30% of its headcount, 
turnover and balance sheet to your own figures. If there are several partner 
enterprises, the same type of calculation must be done for each partner enterprise 
situated immediately upstream or downstream from yours. 
 
So, we can see that the issue of organisation and ownership is a very complex field that has the 
potential to introduce meaning and process into the small firms debate. The EU definitions are 
framed in terms of the degree of ownership and control which is a very much higher bar than the 
term ‘independent’ that drives much of the political rhetoric of small firms, and constructed for 
policy purposes and eligibility for funding (not for analytical purposes). 
 
 
3.4 Qualities of small firms: Organisation and Strategy 
 
The clear focus is on a variety of external empirical measures that may or may not be causally 
related to firm growth and operation. By contrast, there has been a gradual emergence of research 
in management research on values and personality. As Storey (1994, 74) notes, ‘a small firm is not 
simply a scaled down version of a large firm’. Many researchers have thus looked at motivations, 
strategy and behaviour of the firm founders. Beaver and Ross (2000) suggest the key differentiator is 
on the nature of the manager/owners, their relationship with employees, their personal prejudices, 
attitudes and preferences. Other researchers have sub-divided firms into various types based on 
goals and missions. First, the ‘mom and pop’ type enterprise of extremely small firms with little 
marketing expertise or resource, and who do not desire to maximize profits; second, the lifestyle 
business, who have achieved some success, and have some marketing expertise within a limited 
market; but, they have little desire to grow. Third, growth orientated in newly emerging industries of 
high risk and growth (Cravens et al 1994). Various commentators point to the important fact that of 
all small businesses, it is the latter that are in the significant minority (Deakins and Freel, 1999); 
something that undermines the rather blanket support for SMEs. To this we can add the specific 
issues associated with cultural work, that of aesthetic judgment, or affective appreciation of cultural 
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goals. This is an issue that looms large in the work on cultural labour, but has seldom been explored 
in respect to new firm formation (see: McRobbie 1998, 2002). 
 
3.5 The creative and cultural industries 
 
As the Bolton report suggested, the notion of size is not universally applicable, and should be 
considered by sector. It is therefore interesting to examine if there are different (employment) size 
differences between the CCI and all industries. Of course, as the EU specification indicates, issues of 
turnover would offer a more insightful account, and one might expect that the CCI will show 
significant differences here as the value added is greater (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. GVA (Gross Value Added3) for the CCI  in the UK, 2007/08. Source: Annual Business Inquiry, 
Office of National Statistics, 2007. All figures in £/Millions. 
Year  Advertising  Architecture  
 Art and 
Antiques 
Designer 
Fashion 
Video, Film 
and 
Photography 
Music, Visual 
and 
Performing 
Arts Publishing 
Software, 
games 
and 
Electronic 
Publishing 
Radio 
and TV Total 
1997 £3,400 £3,100 £260 £280 £1,900 £2,700 £6,500 £9,800 £3,500 £31,500 
1998 £3,500 £3,200 £270 £270 £1,800 £2,900 £7,300 £13,200 £3,700 £36,300 
1999 £5,500 £3,200 £320 £300 £2,100 £3,100 £8,000 £13,900 £4,600 £41,000 
2000 £6,100 £3,500 £350 £360 £2,100 £3,200 £8,400 £14,800 £4,800 £43,700 
2001 £5,500 £3,600 £390 £320 £1,800 £3,100 £8,800 £16,300 £4,800 £44,700 
2002 £5,400 £3,400 £430 £320 £2,100 £3,300 £8,300 £16,900 £5,000 £45,000 
2003 £5,200 £4,000 £470 £330 £2,400 £3,600 £8,600 £19,800 £4,900 £49,200 
2004 £5,600 £4,100 £490 £380 £2,700 £3,700 £9,100 £22,600 £4,900 £53,600 
2005 £6,500 £4,700 £480 £420 £2,900 £3,300 £9,800 £24,700 £4,900 £57,700 
2006 £5,300 £4,700 £490 £450 £3,800 £3,400 £9,500 £24,500 £5,100 £57,300 
% 
change 56% 52% 88% 61% 100% 26% 46% 150% 46% 82% 
 
* Crafts and design are sub-categories of creative industries but are not included in these figures because the GVA figures are not 
available 
 
     
 
         
3.6 Organisational particularities 
It is for the above reasons that normative policy making, and associated policy processes, may be 
less than effective in the case of small firms generally, and for creative industry firms in particular. 
We have noted that small firms’ activities is not adequately explained by the crowding out thesis, 
nor by generic notions of economic action. A significant body of research points to the various 
                                                 
3 GVA is more accurate then turnover in many ways. Officially it is calculated by using this formula GVA = GDP + subsidies - (direct, sales) 
taxes. 
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strategic modalities associated with small firm management, in part to do with size (or resource), 
and in part associated with the proximity of the owner manager to employees or/and firm. What we 
might refer to as the affective domain of management. Second, we can point to issues that are size 
and sector specific, such as finance and investment (Fraser, 2011). Third, beyond this, we can point 
to a set of issues related to the particular form of cultural markets, and to cultural production 
processes. These too present an affective dimension to activities, one that goes beyond, or even 
contradicts ‘rational’ logic and price signals. This is the focus of the following section. Not only are 
the CCI different from industries in the general economy, they are unusual organisationally and fast 
changing: not a helpful combination for policy makers, or policy evaluators. It is instructive to review 
in more detail the parameters of the CCI organisational forms (see: Pratt 2012).  
 
First, we can point to their organisational ecology. Whilst the CCI do vary significantly from one 
another in this respect; moreover, the CCI, in contradistinction to ‘normal’ industries, tend to what is 
an unusual characteristic that is the ‘missing middle’: organisations are either very large 
multinationals, or micro-enterprises; organisations that may also act in the not for profit field, or as 
social enterprises. At the extreme end of the continuum are multi-nationals, at the other companies 
working on their own account as freelancers. This category of employment, one that is characteristic 
of the cultural sector is unusual in that the person is not in a standard employment relation (Gill and 
Pratt 2008): for example a musician or author who ‘signs up’ to a publisher receives income is on the 
basis of the share of the intellectual property rights and copyright earnings. Consequentially the CCI 
are reliant on a shifting network of intermediaries to link the large and small, the nature of the 
intermediation is dominated by knowledge brokerage (finding buyers and sellers), however, in this 
case the discriminator is not price but quality: and this knowledge of qualities tends to be socially 
and spatially embedded (O'Connor 1998, O'Connor, Banks et al. 2000). 
 
Second, is the fact that work in the CCI tends to be organised on the basis of projects. Projects can 
last as little as a few weeks, or as much as a year or two. Teams are made up to work on projects, 
either drawn from within an organisation, or more commonly from freelancers (Grabher 2002, 
Grabher 2002, Pratt 2006). This leads to the apparent fragility of the CCI, that firm births and deaths 
are regular (see above). However, one may as easily, within the context of the CCI, see this as a 
positive indicator of a fast changing and agile cultural industries eco-system. It does mean that ‘the 
firm’ is less likely to be an anchor for activity or policy, instead a network of skilled labour and 
resources. 
 
Third, is the diversity of organisational forms and markets within the CCI. In part this is related to the 
range of product investment required for a product, and what resource is required. A photograph 
can be taken more easily that a film made, which is different again to writing and publishing a book, 
or releasing a piece of popular music, or making a TV programme, or a video game. The absolute 
level investment and the degree of risk involved may be huge (De Vany 2004, Epstein 2005). The 
result tends to what has been termed ‘winner takes all’ character to markets and institutions (Frank 
and Cook 1996, Caves 2000). Most cultural producers are organised one way or another to produce 
a portfolio of products: all equally expensive and required to be of the highest standard, but success 
will only be visited upon some. The ratio in the film industry is about 1 in 10; however, which of the 
10 is the successful one is unpredictable.  It is not simply a ‘law of averages’, rather excellence is 
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required to ‘enter the race’: the outcome of the race is unpredictable. The desire to shape markets 
and consumption through information or market domination, or control, is great, but not absolute. 
 
Fourth, is the complex overflowing of activities between the formal and informal, for and not-for 
profit, and between the state and commercial activities, and between production and consumption. 
Mutual cross-subsidy takes place not just in time, but also over careers. In fact, it could be argued 
that the complex web of inter-dependencies is one of the core characteristics of the CCI. Private 
individuals are often prepared to invest wildly irrationally in activities in the hope of fame and 
fortune; there is no rational calculus to capture or explain this; however, it is part of the hidden 
resource of CCI that on the whole workers are prepared to over commit their resources to make 
things work (McRobbie 1998, McRobbie 2002), not because they are small firms, but that 
practitioners have no other options: you can’t simply apply for job to be a pop star, or a top fashion  
model. 
 
Fifth, one of the challenges of the creative industries is that they deal with value, or more precisely 
value in creation. It is impossible to anticipate the value of products, artefacts or performances 
before they happen. They are context dependent, and rely on interaction (such as a gig), or a 
community response (a hot book, or film). Cultural products may be ‘better’ than others, but ‘fail’ to 
gain an audience or appreciation. This is why such an important part of work in the creative 
industries is about reputation and appreciation, and how this can be shaped by opinion formers (by 
rhetoric, or by structural power, e.g. the media). All cultural producers are aware of the need to 
make and build audiences and markets, an innovative idea will not find an audience if it is not part of 
an on-going discourse. Arguably, the same processes apply to some extent in all industries (the so-
called culturalisation thesis), but they are clearly acute in the cultural sector. When added to the 
‘winner takes all’ characteristic (above) and the rate of turnover (rate of fashion change) the 
challenges are formidable. They ways that the cultural industries seek to minimise these pressures 
(marketing, creation of ‘seasons’, advertising, charts, monopoly, etc.) shape the necessary strategic 
and organisational responses of firms. In the end, the creative industries have to navigate a complex 
and emerging knowledge pool, to stretch the metaphor, a change in the tides can negate all previous 
knowledge and products. 
 
4.0 Discussion/Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to explore the debate about defining a small firm, or a Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprise (SME), and examining the relevance of this concern to the creative industries and 
creative businesses. The term ‘creative SME’ neatly captures some of the inherent issues in 
attempting to define something that is by extension problematic to define. This paper has: first, 
investigated the formation of the small business in economic and political thought in the UK; second, 
explored how SMEs have been categorized thus far and some of the problems associated with this 
type of definition, especially within the CCI; third, outlined how SMEs that belong to the CCI may fit 
into the category already defined as ‘SME’; namely, that the CCI has peculiarities associated with its 
organisational structures. These peculiarities are not easily measurable and therefore prove difficult 
to incorporate into a fix-all definition of the creative SME. 
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The empirical issues are important to contrast with ideological or idealist understandings of the CCI, 
although as Table 7 shows there are significant sector variations especially with respect to Gross 
Value Added. Thus one conclusion that can be safely brought to the fore is that the CCI encompass a 
large sector-contribution to the overall GDP of the UK ( nothing new here) but that these sectors are 
highly variable with respect to their sole contribution, even though measuring this maybe suspect 
when definitions are brought under scrutiny . That being said, their organisational structures overlap 
and therefore the characteristics of a creative SME is intertwined with not what IS being produced 
but HOW these ‘products’ are being produced. Organisational ( or a lack thereof) structure therefore 
allows for the work of the creative SME, but the creative SME differs in measurable outputs. Thus, if 
we were to scrutinize size (as the European Commission does) in this sector it might be important to 
look at both turnover and employment within the specific activities and sub-sectors of this sector. 
For example, instead of saying that a creative SME is defined as being in the CCI and having less than 
250 employees ( which is currently the case), empirical work looking at one specific sub-sector (say 
the fashion sub-sector) and outlining its normal organisational structure plus GVA and size might be 
prudent. Thus in the fashion SME world, having more than 5 employees and a an annual turnover of 
more than £250,000 may be seen as rather large – as opposed to being defined as a ‘micro’ by EU 
standards. Moreover their (the creative SME) organisational structure dictates their level of 
independence, as the M&S example shows; therefore the notion of independence might be 
dangerously illusory. Thus relationships between firms within a sub-sector and sector are unique to 
places and sector and times and activities. Access to sharing is critical which indicates that there is a 
significant role of a cultural commons, all information is not traded, nor is it contained within firms. 
Coupled with this the notion of what entails innovation in the CCI. Since this sector is inherently 
dealing with symbolic goods innovation models in the CCI differ tremendously and vary with regards 
to such aspects as regional differences. For instance (and using the fashion example again), 
menswear being designed and manufactured in east London may contain regional accents that may 
not be prevalent in say Chelsea. Thus the creation and reproduction of symbolic goods specific to a 
sub-sector may in fact tell two different stories using different production cycles within the same 
sub-sector. 
This amalgam of characteristics makes policy development problematic. First, that solely market 
based incentives are unlikely to be successful; nor are exclusively public and cultural incentives; a 
hybrid is required. Second, the institutions that might normally be the locus of policy – firms - are 
not stable, and not represented by the normative form of the firm. Much of the potential resource 
lies in-between firms in networks that are latent. Third, the levels of risk are huge. Public bodies find 
it difficult to ‘support failure’ (a few winners many require losers; so, this is an insoluble problem 
which usually means public bodies avoid the issue altogether to avoid being pilloried for ‘wasting 
public money’). The strategic weakness and place where intervention is most likely to have greatest 
effect is where institutional capacity is absent or very weak; hence the public sector cannot 
intervene without becoming players themselves. For this, the entry costs for the public sector are 
very high and are closely associated with highly specific knowledge, trust and experience. 
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